







   
         



















































































TERRORIST THREATS AND PUBLIC 
TRANSPORTATION  
 
           




  s       
Public transportation is an activity facing various problems. One of them, very complex and dangerous, is terrorism 
which  together  with  criminal  activities  and  vandalism,  is  making  the  top  of  the  threats  affecting  public 
transportation and therefore urban life quality. Public transportation has several characteristics which make it 
vulnerable to terroris attacks and a main target for them. To compensate for these weeknesses, certain solutions 
are necessary to prevent the attack or in case it already took place, to reduce the human and  material  losses. 
       s: urban area, urban transportation, vandalism, criminal activity. 
                 
Contemporary terrorism turned urban public transportatin in a new theater for its attacks. In various area 
of the world terrorist actions targeted transport systems. Parisian underground train was the target of a 
bomb of the Algerian extremists in 1995 and 1996; Irish Republican Army had a long campaign against 
the English authorities, targeting passanger trains and London underground; Palestinian terrorists used 
suicidal agents who blew themselves up in buses in Israel; in Tokio members of AUM sect attacked the 
underground train with a lethal gas in 1995, and examples can go on. The attacks of September 9 on 
World Trade Center and the Pentagon showed the massive social, political and economic impact they 
may have under certain circumstances, and also pointed out the role of vehicles as an instrument of 
terrorist attacks. More recent the attacks of March 11, 2004 at the railway terminals in Madrid, besides 
the  great  number  of  victims,  commutors  killed  or  injured,  had  a  huge  social  and  political  impact 
influencing  the  parliamentary  elections  in  Spania,  that  were  taking  place  the  following  days,  and 
producing a change of government and policy of the Spanish state in the military campaign in Irak. In 
July  2005,  in  Great  Britain,  56  persons  were  killed  because  of  4  suicidal  attacks  in  the  public 
transportation network. (Litman, 2005) 
A study of the Mineta Transport Institute de Transport shows, for 1997-2000, on a global scale, a 






         
                                            
 


















































































the target locations shows a percentage of 41% buses, 22% trains and underground trains, 10% train 
and underground trains stations, 8% bus terminals, 8% railways, 5% tourist buses, 1% bridges and 
tunnels, 5% other objectives. (Jenkins, 2001) and (Graf, 2008) 
             s   s            s          s                                  s        s 
For those intending to kill people indiscriminately, public transportation is an ideal target. Attacks on the 
public transportation which is the traffic system in the urban areas cause huge damages and panick 
therefore meeting the traditional requirements of terrorism.  According to officials of the transit system 
and  experts  in  system  safety,  certain  characteristics  of  the  mass  public  transportantion  make  it 
vulnerable to terrorist attacks and more difficult to secure. These systems are designed to operate 
openly (non-restricted), with many control free access points, so that a huge number of pleople could 
travel quickly and easily. Its open character make supervision and control of the people going in or out 
of the network, more difficult; on the other hand to ensure safety in the access points along the routes is 
unaffordably expensive. Passangers do not know each other, therefore attackers can easily keep a low 
profile  and  get  away.  Concentration  of  people  in  the  spaces  designed  for  transport  make  them 
vulnerable to conventional explosives and non-conventional arms. (ECMT, 2002) 
Other characteristics of the transit systems such as the large number of travellers , costly infrastructure, 
economic importance and location (large metropolitan areas or tourist destinations),  turn them into 
potential targets. The large number of passangers using the transit network daily, especially during rush 
hours, make any safety measures impossible, (in case of metal, explosive or arms detectors) due to 
huge delays and unaffordable expenses.  
One  more  difficulty  of  transit  safety  resides  in  the  necessity  to  preserve  characteristics  such  as 
accessibility, affordability, availability etc. On the other hand, public transportation should be competitive 
in relation with the car, otherwise, any safety measures causing delays, affecting availability and rising 
travel fares push travellers to use the cars. ( Rossiĭskaia akademiia nauk, 2004) 
One last argument is that public transportation systems are in public places. Other places with similar 
conditions regarding the large concentration of people at one time,  are la big shops of commercial 
centers, busy and crowded streets and avenues, but also the lines of people waiting to pass through 
safety systems. These are extremely vulnerable. To isolate each public place with safety systems is not 







   
         


















































































       s          s       s                     s         s  
Attacks on public transportation are in many cases, just a side of the violent phenomenon in the urban 
area, coinciding with vandalism, armed robbery, theft and aggression. Unlike the other forms of violence 
or  property  distruction,  terrorism  wants  to  get  international  attention  and  to  spread  panick  while 
vandalism  only  wants  to  destroy  property,    to  harass  travellers;  as  a  result  confidence  in  public 
transportantion services decreses and customers leave. Graffiti and vandalism (including robbery, theft 
and  aggression)  usualy  do  not  result  in  injuring  of  killing  people,  still,  they  are  infractional  forms 
favourable to criminal activities and even terrorism. 
Terrorist campaigns unfolded in several countries of Europe, but also in some developing countries 
allowed to accumulate expertise as concerns the terrorist objectives, tactics and technics. Of the total of 
the incidents analyzed bomb attacks rise to almost 60%, followed by ambushes with approximatively 
11%, remote control attacks 9%, hostages taking 5% and sabotage 5%. 
The safety measures used to fight terrorism widely depend on the financing fonds terrorists get. There 
are very important factors such as costs of safety measures, limited security budgets and competition 
for  budget  priorities.  Many  of  the  investments  in  transit  safety  can  be  very  expensive,  while 
improvements are cheap, such as litter bins removal from the crowded areas, locking of rest rooms 
during the night, better illumination of the spaces, better communication with local police or other 
emergency services, plans for crisis management, procedures for bomb threats and objects found, 
which rise suspicions etc. (Lenain, 2002) 
Applying safety measures does not prevent terrorist attacks completely, but they can reduce the risk of 
such attacks and reorientate the actions to less important targets,  resulting in less injured people. As a 
rule, terrorists follow vulnerable targets and try to surprise with their attacks. Such attacks can take 
place anywhere, anytime, while safety measures cannot protect everything all the time. In the aftermath 
of an attack safety measures increase drastically trying to block any other attempt and reassure the 
worried public that measures are taken. If threat diminishes some additional measures are obviously 
suspended. Still, there is a tendency to preserve several safety measures permanently, suggesting that 
the safety level can vary with time, being decreased or incresed according to the suspicion of an attack. 
Building up a general security strategy for the public transportation should take into account some 
fundamentals: 
Transport security should have to major objectives: the main objective is prevention of potential victims 






         
                                            
 


















































































Security measures probably cannot prevent terrorist attacks but they can greatly discourage actions 
against protected places.Number of potential victims can be reduced with a better design of the stations 
and trains, but also with a quick and effective respond in case of attacks. 
Damages can be minimal using technologies and procedures that allow a prompt evaluation and a 
precise diagnosis and a quick and better respond. The efficiency of safety measures reside not only in 
their pre-emptive and intimidating effect but also in the efforts to keep down the number of victims, 
damages and transport networking interruptions. Since coercion and prevention are difficult to maintain, 
due  both  to  the  nature  of  the  terrorist  actions  and  to  the  specific  weaknesses  of  the  public 
transportation, it is only natural to focus on the reduction of potential victims number by an adequate 
design of the transport networks and a quick and efficient respond. 
The  themes  of  public  transportation  safety  fall  into  two  major  classes:  previous  preparation  by 
developing a safety program; respond and return to normal. 
                    
Most of the transport operators have programs which should solve the situations when services are 
interrupted due to various reasons: natural disasters, bad weather, accidents, other incidents including 
criminal actions of terrorism. With such program operators try, as a rule, to reduce damages and to 
keep on providing the services. Programs should be developed together with local authorities(police, fire 
fighters, emergency hospitals), according to the best expertise, approved by operator management, 
checked by tests and practice, and periodically improved. 
4.1. Threat estimation and analysis 
Information about the possible terrorist attacks usually come from government specialized institutions 
and  organizations    but  transport  operators    should  not  ignore  other  inside  or  outside  information 
sources.  The  process  of  threat  and  vulnerability  evaluation  follows  several  steps:  preparation  of 
evaluation  process;  critical  assets  identification  for  protection;  identification  of  assets  with  greatest 
impact on people and system; identification of threats to critical assets; developing scenarios for the 
threats; consequences of threats anticipation; hierarchy of vulnerable spots in public transportation and 








   
         


















































































4.2. Design of stations and means of transport 
When a new station is built (train or underground train) or an old one is rebuilt, safety measures should 
be an important factor of design. A good station design avoids dens or other obstacles, allowing visual 
access in all directions, without corners or dark areas where criminals can hide and terrorists can place 
bombs; good and constant lighting, TV supervision systems, fire resistant doors, good smoke release 
systems, emergency evacuation routs, betc. (Nașcu, 2006) 
Even if travaller wating and circulation platforms should provide easy access, still access restrictions are 
necessary, hence fences and enclosures built for bus garages and underground stations and parking 
zones by the stations. Employees or visitors enter the garages and underground stations only if they 
have permits. (Hoel, 1992) 
Station design should provide good access control and suitable supervision of traveller areas. The most 
performant means are TV systems which offer images from various directions and receive images from 
every corner or area of the station in order to discourage any kind of criminal actions. 
Station building should necessarily include blast resistant areas to shelter the people who cannot be 
quickly evacuated. It is preferably to place them away from the access routes, windows or doors, and to 
provide them with concrete walls and communication means. 
Litter bins should not be placed close to waiting or circulation areas because they could be used to 
place bombs. The places where such objects are positioned should be watched by TV systems or built 
out of blast resistant materials and the bins should be out of transparent materials to monitor their 
contains. 
Vehicles sould be built out of collision and fire resistant materials and, if set on fire, the some released 
should not be toxic. In order to adapt to anti-terrorist measures, objects, inside the vehicle that could 
become projectiles in case of blasts, should be removed, the space beneath chairs should be sealed to 
prevent placing of bombs or chemical devices, and supervision cameras and alarms should be installed 
either visibly or hidden. 
4.3. Setting a security force 
Big  operators  should  use  s  security  forces  pecialized  in  transport  activity.  They  can  be  private 
companies or police agents specialized in public transport. They can be used in areas considered of 
high risk, inside or outside the transport space. There can be used uniform or civilian-clothed units. 






         
                                            
 


















































































used in high risk aras and during violent actions. Transport operator personnel present in the stations 
and  vehicles also has a calming effect on travellers. (Taylor, 2005) 
4.4. Technologies used to provide public transport safety 
There are signaling and supervision systems in the stations or vehicles, railway control systems to 
detect possible sabotage actions, systems to locate in real time vehicles or workers movement  in 
tunners or along the routes, chemical or biological detecting systems etc. 
     s                                    
It is very difficult to prevent and dissuade terrorist actions in public transport due both to the specific 
nature of terrorist attacks and to the specific vulnerability of public transport; that is why authorities try to 
respond quickly and efficiently to minimize the potential number of victims and damages, taking care of 
the victims and their relatives and trying to calm down the nervous population. For a suitable response 
Crisis management program has a paramount role, being an essential component of the general safety 
program.  Crisis  management  program  should  include  procedures  for  the  crisis  team  and  the 
responsabilities of each member.  
The program should specify procedures for evacuation and activity stopping;  helping victims and their 
families  and  relatives;  communication  with  emergency  institutions  and  organizations;  providing 
passangers  safety  after  the  incident;  return  to  providing  services  or  alternative  services;  public 
informations; calming down the passengers. 
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